To have any legitimacy at all, a system of justice has to ensure, for the most part, results that are both fundamentally fair and predictable. You have to make sure the punishment fits the crime, and you can't allow the consequences of breaking the law to be uncertain, or have two cases with similar facts end up with dramatically different results. Now, it doesn't take a genius to see that, in practice, the values of fairness and predictability often conflict with each other. To be truly fair, you have to allow for the possibility of departing—sometimes substantially—from the norm, which creates inconsistencies. On the other hand, to be predictable, you have to be willing to dismiss some individual differences as unimportant given the ultimate goal of consistency. The fairness argument is typically identified with liberals and the predictability argument with conservatives, but people of all political stripes use both arguments depending on the circumstances. Someone opposing predictability will call it simple-minded and callous; if you're in favor of predictability, you call the opposition result-oriented and arbitrary.
Because fairness and predictability are always fighting each other for supremacy, our law is a hodge-podge of decisions, some favoring one and some the other. Some of our most critical legal principles were designed with predictability in mind. These are called "rules." You kill a guy, you're going to jail. You dump industrial sludge in the river, you have to pay penalties. For years, federal judges in this country sentenced convicted criminals according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a series of principles designed to maximize predictability and eliminate suspicious inconsistency in sentencing. In practice, because the guidelines were considered mandatory, they drastically shackled judges' discretion to give an offender a break and are a big part of the reason why there are so many nonviolent drug offenders clogging up our federal prisons. A couple of years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that the guidelines are only discretionary, not mandatory, but they're still out there and judges still use them to channel, or substitute for, their own judgment.
Of course, "inconsistency" is not necessarily a bad thing. If you reach inconsistent results because of racism or sexism, those results aren't legitimate, but there are often perfectly good reasons to treat somewhat similar things differently. And some legal principles are designed to maximize fundamental fairness. These are called "standards." Standards often involve the balancing of one thing against another, or of multiple things against each other, to determine the right result. If you drive your car into someone else's car, whether you have to pay for the damage will depend on who was more careless. If you were driving on the wrong side of the road, it's on you. If they ran a red light, it's on them. If you were driving on the wrong side of the road and hit a car that ran a red light, it's a little harder. If your neighbor is building a fence on your property and you ask a court to make her stop, the court will look at how likely it is that the fence really is on your property and how badly you'll be hurt if the fence gets built, then decide. You have to think about how you apply a standard, and two different people may well apply the same standard differently to the same facts.
Now, I hear you—you're asking, "Who cares?" The reason I'm talking about this is because, while I was out of town a couple of weeks ago, Robert Horry body-checked Steve Nash into the scorer's table in the closing seconds of Game 4 of the Spurs-Suns series, causing Nash's teammates Amare Stoudemire and Boris Diaw to leave the bench. (I know this is old news and this is not the most timely of posts.) Stoudemire and Diaw did not face up to and confront Horry, or anyone else; they were held back by assistants and returned to the bench. But the NBA has a rule that mandates a one-game suspension for any player who leaves the bench in response to on-court hostilities, and in this case they applied the rule dumbly, by rote, and issued the suspensions. As we all know, the depleted Suns, exhausted from playing a six-man rotation, fell apart on perimeter defense at the end of Game 5 at home and then lost Game 6, and the series, two days later in San Antonio. It's hard to deny that the suspensions played a big role in deciding the winner of the series—and, as looks more than probable now, the NBA title.
You saw the rules vs. standards distinction clearly explained in the post-game interviews. Stu Jackson, many years ago the underappreciated coach of the Knicks but now the NBA's disciplinary czar, made it explicit, telling the press, "It's not a matter of fairness. It's a matter of correctness." Stu was looking for compliance with the letter of the law, nothing less. You couldn't have a much clearer statement.
It all would have been much more convincing if the NBA had a leg to stand on. In the first place, you are talking about the most emotionally charged atmosphere imaginable. The conference semifinals, between two teams generally considered the NBA's best, with the visiting team about to unexpectedly even the series at two games apiece. Closing seconds, the game basically decided but pride still a factor. One of the guys on the other team takes a cheap shot at your best player, a guy who is literally irreplaceable in the sense that no one else in the league can do what he does. Anyone who is a part of this team is going to take a couple of steps forward. The guy on the other team was in the wrong, after all. He did something that was objectively bullshit. Plus, Stoudemire and Diaw may have run onto the court, but they never got within 10 feet of any Spurs player. Not only did they never raise their fists or make any other aggressive move, they never even got within punching distance. The assistants were so pissed off themselves that they barely did anything to restrain the players, but as soon as they got their arms up Stoudemire and Diaw stopped moving forward and returned to the bench. Neither guy demonstrated any specific intent to go after any opponent physically, as opposed to a general lizard-brain impulse to help a friend in need. Exactly the sort of instinctive one-for-all spirit a team needs to win a championship, in other words.
Just as important, this was a situation where the consequences of applying the rule rigidly were obviously potentially huge. Remember that 1997 Knicks-Heat series, where the Knicks all left the bench during a Game 5 brawl and had like 17 players, 6 ballboys, the Knicks City Dancers, Harry M. Stevens, and the traveling secretary all given one-game suspensions, which, even spread over two games, cost them the series and one final shot at Jordan's Bulls? Of course you do. So it's not like, in 2007, the NBA didn't know the rule could cost a worthy champion a shot at the title. Here, if you applied the rule rigidly, the Suns would lose 30 points and 20 rebounds a game. With Stoudamire out, they'd lose the offensive half of their two-headed anti-Tim Duncan machine, the guy who takes the ball to the basket and gets Duncan in foul trouble, and the guy who helps Kurt Thomas on defense and cuts the court in half. And with Diaw suspended, they'd lose a very good passer from the perimeter or out of the low post who can run the offense while Nash is on the bench. The NBA had to know that, without these guys, the Suns would almost certainly lose Game 5, putting them in the impossible position of having to win Game 6 in San Antonio just to have the opportunity to play to win the series.
In other words, the greater the consequences, the greater the need for flexibility. If you're going to drop the neutron bomb, you need to be absolutely sure that's the right result. This is the same principle behind the Supreme Court's death-penalty cases, which generally hold that defendants have the right to present, and juries must consider, any conceivably reasonable mitigating circumstance—childhood abuse, provocation, brainwashing—before the jury can sentence someone to death. It makes sense: if you're making a final decision from which the losing party can't recover, you need to be especially careful and do it only if it really serves the interests of justice. But the NBA wasn't flexible; it was rigid. It ignored the heat of the moment, the fact that neither Stoudemire nor Diaw came close to throwing down with anyone, the fact that they returned to the bench when prompted. It applied the rule, and killed the Suns.
But maybe the worst thing about the ruling was that, even if you think predictability is more important than fairness, and the NBA was right to hold fast to the letter of the rule—which is not, I have to admit, a totally crazy position—the league still got it wrong. The day before Horry's body-block earned a two-game suspension, Baron Davis intentionally elbowed Derek Fisher in the head in the closing seconds of the Jazz's Game 4 win against the Warriors. Davis didn't get called for a foul, while Horry did, but all this stuff is reviewed after the game on video. Davis's elbow was just as premeditated as Horry's cross-check, and much more likely to actually cause an injury. But the NBA didn't do anything to Davis. Maybe they held off because the Warriors were the feel-good underdog story of the playoffs; maybe not. But the disparate treatment of Horry and Davis didn't make any sense. It led to the conclusion that the NBA hit Horry for two games only to try to disguise the fact that Horry's bad act ended up hurting the Suns more than the Spurs.
I gotta tell you, that adds up to a really stupid decision. I know folks have compared it to the Tuck Rule situation—the literally correct application of a silly law—and I hear that. But at the very least it shows that the NBA should repeal the current rule at the end of the season, and replace it with a standard that can deliver a result that makes sense. This is basketball, after all, not criminal justice. We can afford a little more flexibility, especially if we're trying to make sure the best team wins.
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